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Introduction 
 
Complicity is an ancient concept in law and ethics. 
One becomes complicit in the wrongdoing of someone else 
by performing actions that contribute to that 
wrongdoing.1 This principle is found in the teachings of 
many religious faiths,2 and it is embedded throughout the 
American legal system.3 It should be no surprise then 
                                               
1 GREGORY MELLEMA, COMPLICITY AND MORAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 10 (2016) (“When someone is complicit in the 
wrongdoing of one or more principal agents, it is by virtue of 
performing a contributing action.”). 
2 See, e.g., THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE pt. II-II, Q. 
62, art. 7 (addressing accomplice liability); JOHN CALVIN, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE EPISTLE OF PAUL TO THE GALATIANS 
AND EPHESIANS 310 (William Pringle trans., 1854) (“It is not 
enough that we do not, of our own accord, undertake anything 
wicked. We must beware of joining or assisting those who do 
wrong. In short, we must abstain from giving any consent, or 
advice, or approbation, or assistance; for in all these ways we 
have fellowship.”); CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH pt. 3, 
¶ 1868; NIK MOHAMED AFFANDI BIN NIK YUSOFF, ISLAM & 
BUSINESS 231 (Ismail Noor ed., 2002) (observing that in Islam, 
“whatever is conducive towards what is prohibited is itself 
forbidden”); Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is there 
Religious Liberty for Moneymakers?, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
59, 68 (2013) (noting that “Judaism prohibits even Jewish 
consumers from facilitating a business owner’s violation of 
Jewish law”). 
3 See, e.g., Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1245 
(2014) (acknowledging that facilitator liability “reflects a 
centuries-old view of culpability: that a person may be 
responsible for a crime he has not personally carried out if he 
helps another to complete its commission”); U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL tit. 9, § 2474 (1998), 
2
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that complicity also appears in the context of religious 
exemptions from laws of general applicability, in which 
the objector believes his conduct would facilitate 
another’s wrongdoing. Over the past few years, high-
profile religious liberty cases such as Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc.4 and Zubik v. Burwell5 have 
highlighted the role of complicity in Free Exercise Clause 
and Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 
jurisprudence. 
Critics of religious exemptions have deployed a 
new argument against accommodations in such cases by 
suggesting that they impose “third-party harm.”6 In 
particular, Professors Douglas NeJaime and Reva Siegel 
argue that these complicity-based claims are novel and 
that the claims “differ in form and in social logic” from 
other free exercise claims.7 For example, a Muslim 
inmate’s religious objection to shaving his beard does not 
                                               
https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-2474-
elements-aiding-and-abetting [https://perma.cc/Z62T-W8CB] 
(“The level of participation [in an unlawful venture] may be of 
relatively slight moment. Also, it does not take much evidence 
to satisfy the facilitation element once the defendant’s 
knowledge of the unlawful purpose is established.” (citations 
omitted)); Matthew Kacsmaryk, Moral Complicity at Court: 
Who Decides?, PUB. DISCOURSE (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.
thepublicdiscourse.com/2016/04/16709/ [https://perma.cc/W6BJ-
SN3X] (“In the modern era, federal, state, and territorial 
governments have enacted myriad statutes, regulations, and 
rules protecting the conscience rights of Americans who 
abstain from practices, procedures, or products that would 
violate their moral duty not to kill or cause harm.”). 
4 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
5 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam). 
6 See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience 
Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and 
Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2522 (2015). 
7 Id. at 2519. 
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stem from any complicity with another’s alleged 
wrongdoing.8 Complicity-based claims, they argue, 
impose “material and dignitary harms” on third parties 
that are not adequately accounted for under current 
doctrine.9  
Professors NeJaime and Siegel define material 
harm as “deterring or obstructing access to goods and 
services,”10 such as abortion or same-sex spousal 
benefits.11 Dignitary harms “refer to the social meaning, 
including stigma, which may result from accommodating 
complicity-based objections.”12 This social meaning is 
communicated when religious objectors treat “third 
parties as sinners in ways that can stigmatize and 
demean.”13 Complicity-based claims are particularly 
stigmatizing, they argue, when refusal of services 
“reflects a widely understood message about a contested 
sexual norm.”14 Because of these third-party harms, 
Professors NeJaime and Siegel argue that religious 
accommodations should be diminished or eliminated in 
many complicity cases.15 
This Article argues that the third-party harm 
theory is fundamentally flawed and that complicity-
based religious accommodations are both a traditional 
and necessary part of the American legal framework. 
                                               
8 See id. at 2524 (citing Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015)). 
9 Id. at 2587 (“[O]ne group of citizens should not bear the 
significant costs of another’s claim to religious exercise.”). 
10 Id. at 2566 (“[Material harm] can also occur as objectors 
withhold information that would enable an individual to 
pursue alternative providers.”).  
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 2522. 
13 Id. at 2576. 
14 Id. at 2577. 
15 Id. at 2516 (“At issue is not only whether but how complicity 
claims are accommodated.”). 
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Part I examines Supreme Court precedent in the area of 
free exercise and finds significant support for complicity-
based accommodations. Part II reevaluates the 
magnitude and legitimacy of the asserted third-party 
harms, then weighs the inconveniences imposed on third 
parties against the injuries to religious objectors should 
accommodations be withdrawn. Part III contends that 
culture war conflicts will not be resolved through the 
elimination of religious accommodations in the complicity 
context and proposes a subsidiarity-based alternative to 
imposing coercive legal penalties on religious objectors. 
 
I. Complicity-Based Accommodations Are Not 
Novel 
 
Professors NeJaime and Siegel acknowledge the 
longstanding and “richly elaborated” theory of 
complicity.16 Yet they assert that religious exemptions 
based on complicity were practically unheard of prior to 
Hobby Lobby and are fundamentally different from the 
precedents RFRA invoked as exemplars.17 Historically, 
however, the law has treated complicity-based claims 
with the same regard as other claims for religious 
accommodation. In fact, Hobby Lobby reaffirmed the 
Supreme Court’s long-established solicitude toward 
complicity-related claims. 
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,18 Amish parents objected to 
the state’s compulsory secondary schooling requirement 
and sought an exemption for Amish children who had 
completed the eighth grade.19 They condemned the 
“values” promoted by high schools and asserted that 
                                               
16 Id. at 2522–23. 
17 Id. at 2524–29. 
18 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
19 Id. at 207. 
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attendance entangled their families in “a ‘worldly’ 
influence in conflict with their beliefs.”20 By participating 
in the high school system, the Amish feared their 
children would be affected by the corrupting activities 
and influences of third-party students, teachers, and 
administrators.21 Thus, on a plausible reading of Yoder, 
the Amish parents pleaded for precisely the sort of 
complicity-based religious exemption that Professors 
NeJaime and Siegel suggest are novel.22 
Furthermore, accommodation for the Amish 
carried the risk of “third-party harm.” The parents 
implicitly condemned those involved with high schooling 
as being engaged in objectionable conduct. Indeed, it 
might be inferred they believed that those who embraced 
the worldly influences of high school would suffer 
damnation.23 If Professors NeJaime and Siegel’s 
characterization of dignitary harm were to be accepted, 
these aspersions would certainly qualify as “dignitary 
harms.” Even potential material harms were at risk. 
Professors NeJaime and Siegel are correct to observe that 
Yoder “conceptualized the interests of the Amish children 
as aligned with their parents, such that the 
accommodation benefited, rather than potentially 
                                               
20 Id. at 210–11. 
21 Id. at 209 (“They believed that by sending their children to 
high school, they would not only expose themselves to the 
danger of the censure of the church community, but . . . also 
endanger their own salvation and that of their children.”). 
22 See Marc O. DeGirolami, Free Exercise By Moonlight, 53 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 105, 136–37 (2016) (advancing this 
interpretation of Yoder). 
23 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210 (“Old Order Amish communities 
today are characterized by a fundamental belief that salvation 
requires life in a church community separate and apart from 
the world and worldly influence.”). 
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harmed, the children themselves.”24 But the 
accommodation was not limited to such cases, and 
indeed, the extent to which an eighth grader can make 
informed decisions about such matters is questionable. 
The Supreme Court granted the accommodation despite 
the potential material and dignitary harms to third 
parties. 
Another important precedent that Professors 
NeJaime and Siegel gloss over is Thomas v. Review 
Board of Indiana Employment Security Division.25 In 
that case, a Jehovah’s Witness who refused work in a 
tank turret factory was denied unemployment 
compensation.26 Although Professors NeJaime and Siegel 
acknowledge that Thomas involved a complicity-based 
claim for accommodation, they attempt to distinguish it 
from Hobby Lobby by claiming that Thomas did “not 
single out a particular group of citizens as sinning.”27 
This is both inaccurate and irrelevant.28  
First, Thomas did suggest that those who 
manufactured the tank turrets—as well as those who 
would eventually use them to kill—were engaged in 
sinful conduct.29 It was precisely because Thomas 
                                               
24 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2526 (citing Yoder, 406 
U.S. at 209). 
25 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
26 Id. at 709. 
27 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2526 n.45. The Supreme 
Court views Thomas as directly analogous to the complicity-
based claims that Professors NeJaime and Siegel criticize. See 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 
(2014) (calling the issue raised in Thomas “nearly identical” to 
the one raised in Hobby Lobby). 
28 See DeGirolami, supra note 22, at 137–38. 
29 Thomas had told the hearing referee: “I really could not, you 
know, conscientiously continue to work with armaments. It 
would be against all of the . . . religious principles that . . . I 
have come to learn. . . .” Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714 (alteration in 
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believed the creation of armaments to be sinful that he 
quit his job. By plausible implication, one could infer that 
Thomas believed those who continued to construct 
armaments (or those who would ultimately use them) 
were acting sinfully.  
Second, it is irrelevant because complicity 
analysis should be focused on the objector’s conduct and 
state of mind, not the principal’s conduct and character.30 
Thus, the only relevant point of inquiry is whether 
Thomas’s conduct (assisting the construction of tank 
turrets) violated his religious beliefs, as he understood 
them.31 Thomas’s moral judgments about his fellow 
                                               
original) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. 
Div., 391 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (1979)). 
30 See DeGirolami, supra note 22, at 138; see also Marc 
DeGirolami, Three Thoughts on Complicity, Dignity, and 
Religious Accommodation, MIRROR JUST. (July 10, 2015), 
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2015/07/three-
thoughts-on-complicity-dignity-and-religious-accommodation 
[https://perma.cc/RJ8S-GPZ4] (“[T]he conflation of conduct and 
character is a recognizable though deeply regrettable move in 
many of the sorts of disputes implicating these issues.”). 
31 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779 (“[I]t is not for us to say 
that their religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial. 
Instead, our ‘narrow function . . . in this context is to determine’ 
whether the line drawn reflects ‘an honest conviction.’” 
(quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 
707, 716 (1981)); see also Eugene Volokh, The Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act and Complicity in Sin, WASH. POST: 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 30, 2014), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/
30/the-religious-freedom-restoration-act-and-complicity-in-sin/ 
[https://perma.cc/YWL5-6JM5] (observing that precisely 
“[w]here the connection becomes too attenuated and morally or 
religiously culpable complicity stops is a question on which 
reasonable people will differ” in a discussion of Hobby Lobby 
and Thomas). Thus, “when the person believes that complicity 
itself is sinful, the question is not whether our secular legal 
system thinks that he has drawn the right line regarding 
8
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factory workers and the ultimate users of the tank 
turrets never factor into the analysis. 
Although complicity-based claims are not 
themselves novel, attempting to distinguish complicity 
claims from other religious accommodation claims is 
novel. Presumably, under the third-party harm theory, a 
Hobby Lobby-style case would be resolved differently 
when (A) the objector believes the use of abortion-
inducing drugs is sinful than when (B) the objector 
believes that insurance or drugs are forbidden as a 
general matter (that is, the objection arises without the 
taint of a “sin” claim). This would be a strange result—
one that asks judges to scrutinize the form of the 
objector’s religious reasoning. Not only is this a task that 
judges are unsuited to perform, but it encourages 
religious people to formulate their objections in creative 
ways to avoid complicity. Thus, if the Amish families in 
Yoder formulate their objection in terms of objecting to 
secular education, they will likely win. But if they phrase 
their objection as avoiding complicity with a corrupt 
system of education, they will likely lose. It is more 
reasonable to maintain the current rule that an objector’s 
moral reasoning is irrelevant for exemption purposes.32 
 
II. Balancing Harms: Third Parties v. Religious 
Objectors 
 
                                               
complicity; it is whether he sincerely believes that the 
complicity is sinful.” Id. 
32 Mark L. Rienzi, Unequal Treatment of Religious Exercises 
under RFRA: Explaining the Outliers in the HHS Mandate 
Cases, 99 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 10, 11 (2013) (“Properly 
understood, RFRA’s ‘substantial burden’ analysis examines 
whether the government is coercing a believer to abandon a 
religious exercise . . . . [T]he underlying religious reasons for 
the religious exercise should be entirely irrelevant.”). 
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The third-party harm theory focuses on “material 
and dignitary harms” that those invoking complicity-
based religious objections impose on others. But the 
significance of these harms and the extent to which they 
should be considered in RFRA analysis is questionable. 
Furthermore, the emphasis on third parties obscures or 
ignores the harms that would be imposed on religious 
individuals if the law no longer accommodated their 
beliefs to the extent possible. To accurately evaluate the 
relative social cost of permitting or denying complicity-
based accommodations, both sides of the harm equation 
must be considered. 
This Part will first re-examine, with a critical eye, 
the material and dignitary harms Professors NeJaime 
and Siegel identify. Then, using their framework of third-
party harm, I will weigh the harms imposed on religious 
objectors should RFRA-style accommodations be 
weakened or withdrawn in complicity cases. 
 
A. Harms to Third Parties 
 
Professors NeJaime and Siegel identify a series of 
material and dignitary harms to third parties that they 
believe set complicity-based claims apart from other 
requests for religious accommodation. In this section, the 
scope and magnitude of the alleged harms to third parties 
will be critically re-examined. 
 
1. Material Harms 
 
Material harms include the inability to obtain 
certain healthcare information and services, such as 
abortion, emergency contraception, and assisted 
10
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reproduction;33 difficulty finding wedding venues and 
vendors for same-sex ceremonies;34 trouble obtaining 
privately-provided social services, such as adoption 
services;35 and denial of spousal insurance coverage or 
other employment benefits to same-sex partners.36 
Professors NeJaime and Siegel worry that complicity-
based refusals in these areas will lead to “an 
unpredictable marketplace” for same-sex couples and 
others seeking sexual and reproductive services.37 
Significant material harms are indeed a relevant 
concern and may be a compelling state interest. 
Nevertheless, there are at least three reasons why 
Professors NeJaime and Siegel’s characterization of 
these harms is overstated. First, material hardships that 
third parties might face due to religiously motivated 
refusals are already doctrinally accounted for under the 
“compelling state interest” prong of RFRA analysis.38 
                                               
33 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2557–58, 2573. 
34 See id. at 2562–63. 
35 Id. at 2573–74. 
36 See id. at 2563 n.195 and accompanying text. 
37 Id. at 2574. 
38 See DeGirolami, supra note 22, at 133 (“Compelling state 
interests include third party interests within the statutory 
calculus. Indeed, one might simply say that compelling state 
interests just exactly are third party interests of adequate 
gravity. Whose interests is the government protecting in 
resisting a religious accommodation if not those of third 
parties?”); Richard W. Garnett, Accommodation, 
Establishment, and Freedom of Religion, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN 
BANC 39, 46 (2014) (“The justices said in Cutter that . . . ‘courts 
must take adequate account of the burdens a requested 
accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries,’ but RFRA, by 
its own terms, appears to require courts to do precisely that.” 
(quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005))); see 
also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (“It is basic 
that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some 
colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive 
11
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Professors NeJaime and Siegel acknowledge this when 
they observe the latent concern for third-party harms in 
the Hobby Lobby and Wheaton College v. Burwell39 
decisions.40 If courts considered third-party harm as a 
distinct prong of analysis reserved for complicity cases, 
they would double-count the harms of accommodation 
and effectively give the state “another bite at the apple.”41 
Under existing doctrine, only the most serious material 
harms, “endangering paramount [governmental] 
interests,”42 are factored into RFRA’s compelling state 
interest analysis. This is appropriate because although 
“[m]ost exercises of constitutional rights inflict costs on 
                                               
constitutional area, ‘[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering 
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 
516, 530 (1944))) (explaining what constitutes a compelling 
state interest). RFRA ultimately incorporated this 
understanding of compelling governmental interests. See 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(b). 
39 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014). 
40 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37 (“That 
consideration [of third party harm] will often inform the 
analysis of the Government’s compelling interest and the 
availability of a less restrictive means of advancing that 
interest.”); NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2530  (“Concern 
about protecting third parties from harm was a structuring 
principle of the Court’s [Hobby Lobby] decision . . . . Justice 
Alito’s majority opinion proceeded on the assumption that the 
government has a compelling interest in ensuring women’s 
‘cost-free access to . . . contraceptive methods.’” (second 
alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779–80 (2014))); see 
also Wheaton, 134 S. Ct. at 2807 (“Nothing in this interim order 
affects the ability of the applicant’s employees and students to 
obtain, without cost, the full range of FDA approved 
contraceptives.”). 
41 DeGirolami, supra note 22, at 133. 
42 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 
U.S. 516, 530 (1944)). 
12
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others . . . . not everyone who feels harmed is harmed in 
a legally cognizable way.”43 Depending on the 
circumstance, the mere desire to obtain nonessential 
goods and services may not be a significant material 
harm deserving of judicial consideration. 
Second, market forces are capable of solving most 
cases of material hardship when religious objectors 
decline to provide services.44 Though many business 
owners and organizational directors hold religious 
objections to participation in same-sex marriages or 
providing controversial reproductive services, a greater 
number hold the opposite view.45 Even those who object 
may not be willing to face the legal, social, and economic 
penalties of refusing service.46 In most cases, non-
objecting wedding vendors and pharmacists will be 
available to provide their services, and the alleged 
material harms will be nonexistent.47 Although 
Professors NeJaime and Siegel worry that some 
individuals will be unable to obtain emergency 
contraception or HIV medication,48 extensive fact-finding 
in a pharmacist objection case could not identify a single 
instance of an individual who was unable to obtain 
emergency contraception or HIV drugs as a result of a 
                                               
43 Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty for Politically Active 
Minority Groups: A Response to Professors NeJaime and Siegel, 
125 YALE L.J. F. 369, 379 (2016). 
44 Id. at 379 (“In a market economy, refusals of service rarely 
result in anyone having to do without.”). 
45 See id. 
46 See id. (“Even among those with serious moral objections, 
few are willing to endure the risk of litigation, boycotts, 
defamatory reviews, and vandalism that can follow in the wake 
of refusing service on conscientious grounds.”). 
47 See id. at 379–80 (noting the paucity of complicity-based 
objections and the lack of empirical evidence supporting claims 
of widespread refusals). 
48 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2539–40, 2573. 
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religiously motivated refusal.49 Even “in more 
conservative, religious, and rural parts of the country”50 
where religious objections are likely more common, 
individuals will rarely find themselves without an 
adequate alternative for long.51 
Finally, the law has already established limiting 
principles for instances when inability to obtain essential 
services would inflict serious material harm. Life-
threatening medical emergencies are a prominent 
example. Even though most state medical conscience 
laws do not have emergency exceptions, “federal law 
requires hospitals to treat or stabilize patients in 
emergencies, and that federal mandate overrides all 
contrary state law.”52 It is appropriate for the law to set 
reasonable limitations on the circumstances in which 
religious healthcare providers may refuse to perform 
                                               
49 See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 854 F. Supp. 2d 925, 948 (W.D. 
Wash. 2012), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Stormans, Inc. v. 
Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1071 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 
S. Ct. 2433, 2434 (2016) (“[A]fter years of test shopping and 
litigation, Defendants have not identified even one instance 
where a pharmacist refused to fill or referred a patient because 
of a personal, non-conscientious objection. Despite frequent 
mentions of HIV during the rulemaking process, there is no 
evidence that any patient has ever been denied HIV drugs due 
to a conscientious or “personal” objection. . . . Finally, no Board 
witness, or any other witness, was able to identify any 
particular community in Washington—rural or otherwise—
that lacked timely access to emergency contraceptives or any 
other time-sensitive medication.”). 
50 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2574. 
51 Under a Keynesian economic account, demand creates its 
own supply. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Demand Creates Its Own 
Supply, N.Y. TIMES: THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL (Nov. 3, 
2015, 1:23 PM), https://nyti.ms/2q7v1nN. 
52 Laycock, supra note 43, at 381 (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1395dd(b)–(c) (2012)). 
14
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urgent, life-saving procedures.53 In the context of 
abortion, which seems to be Professors NeJaime and 
Siegel’s primary area of concern,54 such circumstances 
may never even arise.55 
 
2. Dignitary Harms 
 
Next, Professors NeJaime and Siegel catalogue 
dignitary harms they believe are not adequately 
accounted for in the RFRA compelling state interest 
analysis. Refusals to provide abortifacients or services for 
a same-sex wedding, for example, communicate “a widely 
understood message about a contested sexual norm.”56 
And accommodating such refusals conveys a “social 
meaning” that stigmatizes lawful conduct.57 These harms 
often have emotional or symbolic effects. 
                                               
53 This may not be the end of the analysis, however. It may be 
preferable to permit religiously objecting hospitals to continue 
to operate according to their beliefs (which inflicts some third-
party harms) rather than force them to close down altogether 
(which would inflict a greater aggregate amount of third-party 
harms). See infra notes 103–06 and accompanying text. 
54 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2566–69. 
55 Experts in obstetrics and gynecology dispute the assertion 
that abortion is ever medically necessary. See COMM. ON 
EXCELLENCE IN MATERNAL HEALTHCARE, DUBLIN 
DECLARATION ON MATERNAL HEALTHCARE (2012), http://
www.dublindeclaration.com/ [https://perma.cc/X75K-MRLJ] 
(declaring that “direct abortion”—the purposeful destruction of 
the unborn child—“is not medically necessary to save the life 
of a woman,” and affirming “a fundamental difference between 
abortion, and necessary medical treatments that are carried 
out to save the life of the mother, even if such treatment results 
in the loss of life of her unborn child.”). 
56 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2577. 
57 Id. at 2522 (“By dignitary harms, we refer to the social 
meaning, including stigma, which may result from 
accommodating complicity-based objections.”). 
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Despite anecdotal accounts that refusals leave 
some customers feeling hurt or offended,58 it is 
unpersuasive that permitting accommodations actually 
imposes any dignitary harm. There are both practical 
and theoretical difficulties with demonstrating the 
reality of dignitary harms. On a practical level, offenses 
are subjective and difficult to quantify. Does politely and 
respectfully declining to arrange flowers for a same-sex 
wedding communicate an injurious “social meaning” to 
would-be customers?59 Perhaps for some, perhaps not for 
others. Reasonable customers might disagree about 
whether their dignity has been impugned. Would 
different meanings be communicated if an objector said, 
“I would be complicit in your sin” rather than “I would be 
sinning myself”?60 In effect, courts would have to rely on 
the testimony of the third party to determine how much 
harm a refusal inflicted. It would be easy for a politically 
                                               
58 See, e.g., id. at 2575–78.  
59 See Brief for Appellants at 13, State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 
389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017) (No. 91615-2), 2015 WL 12632392 
(“Mr. Ingersoll says that Mrs. Stutzman took his hand and 
explained ‘she could not do the flowers because of her 
relationship with Jesus Christ.’ According to him, she also said, 
‘You know I love you dearly. I think you're a wonderful person 
. . . . But my religion doesn't allow me to do this.’ Mrs. Stutzman 
said all of this in a kind and considerate way.” (alteration in 
original)); Answer at 12, State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., No. 13-
2-00871-5 (Wash. Super. 2015), 2013 WL 10257927 
(“Emotional about her convictions and her decision to decline, 
Barronelle touched Robert’s hand and kindly told him that she 
could not create the floral arrangements for his wedding 
because of her Christian faith. . . . Barronelle and Mr. Ingersoll 
hugged each other, and he left the store.”). 
60 Laycock, supra note 43, at 382; see also supra note 30 and 
accompanying text. 
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influential interest group to define anything it does not 
like as “harmful” to its members’ dignity.61 
On the conceptual level, Professors NeJaime and 
Siegel’s account of dignitary harm assumes that dignity 
is conferred by others or by the government. According to 
their theory, “the state’s authority includes the power to 
confer individual dignity as a self-standing civic good. 
People want to be dignified by the state, their self-worth 
to be accorded official validation, and they perceive state-
countenanced indignities meant for the protection of 
religious freedom as real injuries demanding state 
remediation.”62 But this is a mistaken understanding of 
human dignity that is fundamentally at odds with the 
American tradition. It “rejects the idea—captured in our 
Declaration of Independence—that human dignity is 
innate.”63 If dignity is innate to the human person, rather 
                                               
61 Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 
1169, 1171 (2007) (reviewing MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE 
GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2005)) (“We also have 
an expansive capacity to define as harmful anything we don’t 
like. A rule that no religious group could do anything the 
political process defined as harmful would leave all religions at 
the mercy of any interest group that could persuade some 
regulatory body to act.”). 
62 DeGirolami, supra note 22, at 130 (summarizing the theory 
espoused by Professors NeJaime and Siegel). 
63 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2631 (2015) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting). Justice Thomas’s remarks on the intrinsic 
nature of human dignity are worth including in full: 
 
Human dignity has long been understood 
in this country to be innate. When the Framers 
proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence 
that “all men are created equal” and “endowed 
by their Creator with certain unalienable 
Rights,” they referred to a vision of mankind in 
which all humans are created in the image of 
God and therefore of inherent worth. That 
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than conferred by the state, third parties cannot be 
deprived of their dignity through legal accommodations 
for religious objectors.64 
Even if dignitary harms could be proven and 
quantified, it is unclear that the law itself plays any role 
in imposing such harms. As between the religious 
                                               
vision is the foundation upon which this Nation 
was built. 
The corollary of that principle is that 
human dignity cannot be taken away by the 
government. Slaves did not lose their dignity 
(any more than they lost their humanity) 
because the government allowed them to be 
enslaved. Those held in internment camps did 
not lose their dignity because the government 
confined them. And those denied governmental 
benefits certainly do not lose their dignity 
because the government denies them those 
benefits. The government cannot bestow 
dignity, and it cannot take it away. 
The majority's musings are thus deeply 
misguided, but at least those musings can have 
no effect on the dignity of the persons the 
majority demeans. Its mischaracterization of 
the arguments presented by the States and 
their amici can have no effect on the dignity of 
those litigants. Its rejection of laws preserving 
the traditional definition of marriage can have 
no effect on the dignity of the people who voted 
for them. Its invalidation of those laws can 
have no effect on the dignity of the people who 
continue to adhere to the traditional definition 
of marriage. And its disdain for the 
understandings of liberty and dignity upon 
which this Nation was founded can have no 
effect on the dignity of Americans who continue 
to believe in them. 
 
Id. at 2639. 
64 See id. 
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objector and the third party, the law is neutral. It takes 
neither the side of the objector (proscribing the conduct 
the objector views as sinful or requiring everyone 
similarly situated to decline their services) nor the side 
of the customer (forcing all providers to engage in 
objectionable commercial transactions against their 
will).65 It allows both parties the opportunity to order 
their affairs as they see fit. Even if critics of religious 
accommodations are correct to characterize exemptions 
as a privilege of private discrimination,66 it is not obvious 
that the law imposes dignitary harms, or that the 
dignitary harms stemming from private discrimination 
constitute a compelling state interest.67 On the other 
                                               
65 See Sherif Girgis, Nervous Victors, Illiberal Measures: A 
Response to Douglas NeJaime and Reva Siegel, 125 YALE L.J. 
F. 399, 403 (2016) (“Legally enforcing a norm against someone 
suggests coercing her to follow it. So Professors NeJaime and 
Siegel are lumping traditionalist-conduct exemptions together 
with legal enforcement of traditionalist views. That seems fair 
only if one assumes that the default is not to accommodate 
these views-so that doing so seems like a gratuitous imposition 
on others. Only then does actually coercing traditionalists to 
violate their consciences seem like the neutral norm.”). 
66 This characterization is contested. See id. (“[C]alling 
exemptions a ‘special advantage’ is tendentious. It assumes 
that the default in a constitutional democracy is not to protect 
conscience claims that might make a political splash. Only 
then does protecting them anyway seem like favoritism.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
67 The only free exercise case finding a compelling state interest 
in eliminating private discrimination was Bob Jones University 
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983). See Alex Reed, 
RFRA v. ENDA: Religious Freedom and Employment 
Discrimination, 23 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 2, 38 (2016). In Bob 
Jones, the state interest in promoting racial equality in 
education, expressed by all three branches of the federal 
government over the course of several decades, outweighed the 
religious claimant’s interest in free exercise. See 461 U.S. at 
604. Racial discrimination in education results in both 
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hand, if courts adopted the dignitary harm theory, it 
could become a self-fulfilling prophesy: the more that 
courts “say that a policy or belief expresses disdain for a 
group, the more it will take on that social meaning.”68 
Even if the law imposed a dignitary harm, this 
harm is non-unique and cannot be considered by courts. 
The First Amendment permits speech and other forms of 
expression that impose dignitary harms all the time. 
What makes dignitary harm a trump card for free 
exercise, but not for other First Amendment liberties, 
such as free speech or freedom of the press? Because 
dignitary harms “are expressive harms, based on the 
‘communicative impact’ of the religious practice,”69 they 
                                               
material and dignitary harms under Professors NeJaime and 
Siegel’s rubric. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe the 
Court’s judgment was limited in scope and not generally 
applicable to issues of sexual mores with which Professors 
NeJaime and Siegel are concerned. See Girgis, supra note 65, 
at 411. See generally Johnny Rex Buckles, The Sexual Integrity 
of Religious Schools and Tax Exemption, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 255 (2017). 
68 See Girgis, supra note 65, at 404. Professor Richard Epstein 
expresses a similar concern that countenancing such harms-
without-legal-injury would make “virtually all human conduct 
. . . actionable.” Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for the 
First Amendment, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 25 (2018). He 
continues: 
 
To protect individuals against mere offensive 
conduct is to invite people to merit that exalted 
status by getting angrier and angrier, so that 
their private resentments give strong claims of 
rights against one another. Everyone can play 
this game so that mutual indignation becomes 
the source of great anxiety or worse. 
 
Id. 
69 Laycock, supra note 43, at 376. 
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are precisely the sorts of harms that the government is 
normally disallowed from considering as a legitimate 
state interest.70 First Amendment jurisprudence is 
replete with instances of protected speech that impose 
dignitary harm on third parties: parade organizers may 
exclude disfavored groups,71 proselytizers may insult 
their listeners’ most cherished beliefs,72 private 
expressive associations may discriminate against 
members based on their sexual conduct,73 and protesters 
                                               
70 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (“The 
government generally has a freer hand in restricting 
expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or 
spoken word. It may not, however, proscribe particular conduct 
because it has expressive elements.” (citations omitted)); 
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (requiring 
the state interest in regulating conduct be “unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression”); see also Matal v. Tam, 137 S. 
Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (8-0 decision) (finding that the 
government cannot refuse to register a trademark on the 
grounds that “it expresses ideas that offend”). 
71 See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of 
Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 578–79 (1995) (9-0 decision) (ruling that 
the state’s interest in nondiscrimination could not be invoked 
to require a private parade organizer to modify its expressive 
conduct by including an LGBT group) (“The very idea that a 
noncommercial speech restriction be used to produce thoughts 
and statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all 
people, grates on the First Amendment, for it amounts to 
nothing less than a proposal to limit speech in the service of 
orthodox expression.”). 
72 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) 
(affirming the right of a Jehovah’s Witness to play a 
phonograph record that “attacked the [Catholic] religion and 
church” and “incensed” listeners). 
73 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647–61 (2000); 
see also Laycock, supra note 43, at 377 (observing that “Dale 
had been an active and engaged scout for twelve years; the 
dignitary harm of being excluded from scouting at that point 
must have been vastly greater than the typical dignitary harm 
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may express even the most vulgar and offensive slogans 
at their audience’s most vulnerable moments.74 The effect 
of such speech on third parties is legally irrelevant.75 
That some third parties will find religiously motivated 
refusals to be upsetting, offensive, or disagreeable is no 
doubt true. But the resulting emotional or symbolic 
injuries are simply not a matter of judicial concern. 
It is inconsistent with First Amendment doctrine 
and norms to assert that religious refusals that either 
explicitly or implicitly “reflect[] and reiterate[] a familiar 
message about contested sexual norms”76 deserve less 
protection because of the viewpoint expressed by that 
                                               
of being refused a one-time arms-length transaction” but that 
“no Justice found a compelling interest in preventing [that] 
harm”). 
74 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 448 (2011) (8-1 decision) 
(upholding protection of slogans such as “‘God Hates the 
USA/Thank God for 9/11,’ ‘America is Doomed,’ ‘Don't Pray for 
the USA,’ ‘Thank God for IEDs,’ ‘Thank God for Dead Soldiers,’ 
‘Pope in Hell,’ ‘Priests Rape Boys,’ ‘God Hates Fags,’ ‘You're 
Going to Hell,’ and ‘God Hates You’” displayed at a soldier’s 
Catholic funeral). 
75 See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1763 (“We have said time and again 
that ‘the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited 
merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of 
their hearers.’” (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 
(1969))); Snyder, 562 U.S. at 458 (“Such speech cannot be 
restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.”); 
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574 (“[T]he point of all speech protection . . . 
is to shield just those choices of content that in someone's eyes 
are misguided, or even hurtful.”); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414 (“If 
there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, 
it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an 
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable.”). 
76 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2576. 
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refusal.77 This impermissibly singles out religious 
speakers who affirm traditional sexual moral norms for 
disfavored status. The viewpoint-neutrality violation 
here is even more egregious because it specially targets 
religious groups because those groups are politically 
engaged in culture-wide disputes about the morality of 
abortion and same-sex marriage.78 Professors NeJaime 
                                               
77 See supra note 69; see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors 
of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“When the 
government targets not subject matter, but particular views 
taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First 
Amendment is all the more blatant. Viewpoint discrimination 
is thus an egregious form of content discrimination. The 
government must abstain from regulating speech when the 
specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the 
speaker is the rationale for the restriction.” (citation omitted)); 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992) (“We 
have long held, for example, that nonverbal expressive activity 
can be banned because of the action it entails, but not because 
of the ideas it expresses . . . .”). 
78 Professors NeJaime and Siegel place significant emphasis on 
the fact that many religious objectors to same-sex marriage 
and abortion are engaged in a broader politically active 
community. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2542–45 
(noting with concern that “complicity-based conscience claims 
are asserted in society-wide conflicts by mobilized groups and 
individuals acting in coalitions that reach across religious 
denominational lines”). They assert that dignitary harms are 
especially pernicious when such “a mass movement amplifies 
[the refusal’s] power to demean.” Id. at 2578. In other words, 
Professors NeJaime and Siegel contend, “Because these 
conscientious objectors engage in a political argument, they 
lose their right to conscientious objection.” See Laycock, supra 
note 43, at 371 (summarizing their view); see also Girgis, supra 
note 65, at 402 (“The implication is clear: Officials should 
discount claims when granting them might empower believers 
to push for their views, or even change laws they oppose.”). 
This is preposterous. It also betrays a desperation to “lock-
in” the newly prevailing cultural orthodoxy on contested moral 
issues. As Laycock put it: “Religious conservatives are 
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and Siegel would likely have little objection to an 
“Orthodox Jew with a wholesale grocery business [who] 
refuses to stock or sell nonkosher items” in violation of 
local ordinances because “he does not want to tempt or 
assist any other Jew to consume the nonkosher items.”79 
Even though this is a complicity-based objection, it does 
not implicate a “national political battle over nonkosher 
food” and Professors NeJaime and Siegel would likely not 
be concerned about the “social meanings” the shopkeeper 
communicates to customers who are “harmed or 
inconvenienced.”80 Their argument depends (at least in 
part) on the socio-political context of religious 
accommodations, which is currently concentrated on 
conflicts with the sexual revolution. 
Religious actors are free to express tenets of their 
faith that either explicitly or implicitly tell non-members 
that they are sinning or will suffer damnation.81 Yet the 
                                               
constitutionally entitled to argue for their views on the 
regulation of sex . . . . And their exercise of that right is not a 
ground for forfeiting other rights they may have, including 
their right to religious exemptions. . . . Religious conservatives 
do not forfeit their right to conscientious objection by making 
political arguments about the laws they object to, and they do 
not forfeit their right to make political arguments by invoking 
their right to conscientious objection.” Laycock, supra note 43, 
at 371–72.  
79 Laycock, supra note 43, at 382. 
80 Id. Laycock observes that this hypothetical also 
demonstrates that “[c]omplicity is irrelevant to Professors 
NeJaime and Siegel’s argument—unless they mean for readers 
to assume that complicity claims are a lesser kind of claim, less 
deserving of protection.” Id. at 382–83. 
81 See Girgis, supra note 65, at 406 (“Religious freedom includes 
nothing if not the rights to worship, proselytize, and convert—
forms of conduct (and speech) that can express the conviction 
that outsiders are wrong. Perhaps not just wrong, but deluded 
about matters of cosmic importance around which they have 
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law does not prohibit these more straightforward sources 
of dignitary injury. It would be perverse to contend that 
directly saying, “You are a murderer!”82 is protected 
speech, but that the speaker should be penalized for 
indirectly communicating that same “social meaning” 
through her refusal of services.83 The notion that 
religious accommodations should be curtailed to shelter 
third parties from messages about sin they do not like is 
truly remarkable for its audacity. 
 
B. Harms to Religious Objectors 
 
There is serious reason to doubt the model of 
third-party harm that Professors NeJaime and Siegel 
propose. But assuming material and dignitary harms 
should be considered in complicity cases, how should 
courts evaluate the harms to third parties as compared 
to the harms to the religious objectors themselves? To 
gather a sense of the true social cost of accommodation 
versus non-accommodation, the potential material and 
dignitary harms imposed on religious objectors must also 
be considered. 
If complicity-based accommodations were to be 
significantly weakened or withdrawn, it is improbable 
that sincere religious objectors would continue to engage 
in business that makes them complicit with what they 
                                               
ordered their lives—even damnably wrong.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
82 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2576. 
83 See id. at 2586 (“Are there ways to accommodate religious 
persons without giving legal sanction to their view that other 
law-abiding citizens are sinning? If the government grants an 
accommodation, is the accommodation structured to block or 
amplify dissemination of religious claims about the sins of 
other citizens?”). 
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believe to be sinful.84 In the long run, sincere religious 
objectors might leave an entire industry altogether. In 
the short term, religious objectors will be subjected to 
catastrophic fines and penalties, as has been the case 
when RFRA-style protections are unavailing. As will be 
seen, the material and dignitary harms imposed on 
religious objectors would be significant, both in scope and 
magnitude, if RFRA accommodations were diminished or 
eliminated in complicity cases. 
 
1. Material Harms 
 
When RFRA protections are unavailable or 
denied, religious objectors commonly face grave 
consequences for refusing to provide goods or services in 
situations they believe would make them complicit with 
                                               
84 Cases are plentiful in which religious objectors choose to 
close their businesses rather than operate in a manner 
contrary to their convictions. See infra notes 85–97 and 
accompanying text; see also Epstein, supra note 68, at 36 (“The 
religious organizations only ask that people, for a limited 
subset of services, go down the block to another business that 
is happy to serve them. The human rights proponents ask 
people to give up their religious beliefs or go out of business 
entirely.”). 
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sin. Florists,85 bakers,86 wedding photographers,87 and 
other artistic professionals88 who object to participating 
                                               
85 See, e.g., State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 
2017). Baronelle Stuzmann, the elderly owner of Arlene’s 
Flowers in Richland, Washington, declined to provide wedding 
flower arrangements for a longtime customer’s same-sex 
wedding. Id. at 549. As a result, Stuzmann was found 
personally liable for violating Washington’s law against 
discrimination and Consumer Protection Act. Id. at 550. The 
Washington Supreme Court affirmed the judgment ordering 
Stuzmann to pay monetary damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. 
Id. at 568. In a media statement, Stuzmann’s lawyers alleged 
that the judgment threatens “not only her business, but also 
her family’s savings, retirement funds, and home.” Washington 
Floral Artist to Ask US Supreme Court to Protect Her Freedom, 
ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM (Feb. 16, 2017), 
http://www.adfmedia.org/News/PRDetail/8608 [https://perma.cc/
4ZLB-N7XP]. 
Although the State of Washington has a religious freedom 
clause in its constitution, it has no RFRA statute. WASH. 
CONST., art. I, § 11; see Hunter Schwarz, 19 States that have 
‘Religious Freedom’ Laws Like Indiana’s that No One is 
Boycotting, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2015), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/03/27/19-states-that-
have-religious-freedom-laws-like-indianas-that-no-one-is-
boycotting/ [https://perma.cc/QKP6-XHQL]. 
86 See, e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 
(Colo. App. 2015), cert. denied, No. 15SC738, 2016 WL 1645027 
(Colo. Apr. 25, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 
(2017). A same-sex couple brought complaint against the 
proprietor of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Jack Phillips, for violating 
Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) when he declined 
to bake a cake for their wedding ceremony. Id. at 277. Phillips 
was found guilty and ordered to re-educate his staff and amend 
his company policies to comply with CADA to avoid financial 
penalties. Id. Masterpiece Cakeshop no longer offers wedding 
cakes. See Bakery Will Stop Making Wedding Cakes After 
Losing Discrimination Case, CBS DENVER (May 30, 2014), 
http://denver.cbslocal.com/2014/05/30/bakery-will-stop-making-
wedding-cakes-after-losing-discrimination-case/ 
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in same-sex ceremonies frequently face catastrophic fines 
and even potential jail time, which threatens their 
livelihoods and well-being. Owners of small bed-and-
                                               
[https://perma.cc/7423-AFXE]. Although the State of Colorado 
has a religious freedom clause in its constitution, it has no 
RFRA statute. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 4; Schwarz, supra 
note 85. 
For the case of Sweet Cakes by Melissa, see infra notes 94–
98 and accompanying text. 
87 See, e.g., Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428 
(N.M. App. 2012). When Jonathan and Elaine Huguenin, the 
owners of Elane Photography, declined to photograph Vanessa 
Willock’s same-sex commitment ceremony, Willock filed a 
complaint with the New Mexico Human Rights Commission. 
Id. at 433. An administrative hearing found Elane 
Photography guilty of violating the New Mexico Human Rights 
Act and awarded $6,637.94 in attorneys’ fees to Willock. See id. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. Elane 
Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 77 (N.M. 2013). In 
a separate concurrence, Justice Bosson wrote that although the 
Huguenins “now are compelled by law to compromise the very 
religious beliefs that inspire their lives,” this sacrifice “is the 
price of citizenship.” Id. at 79, 80 (Bosson, J., concurring). 
88 Joanna Duka and Breanna Koski, the owners of a Phoenix-
based art studio that specializes in lettering and calligraphy 
for wedding invitations, have appealed the denial of a pre-
enforcement challenge against a local ordinance that requires 
them to provide services to same-sex weddings and prevents 
them from communicating their faith-based reasons for 
celebrating marriages between one man and one woman. See 
Brief for Appellant at 1–2, Brush & Nib Studio v. City of 
Phoenix, No. CV2016-052251, 2017 WL 1113222 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
Mar. 8, 2017). Violation of the ordinance carries penalties of up 
to $2,500 in fines and six months in jail. See PHX., ARIZ., CODE 
§§ 1-5, 18-4, 18-7 (2010); see also Artists to Appeals Court: Halt 
Phoenix Ordinance that Punishes Artistic Freedom with Jail 
Time, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM (Mar. 9, 2017), 
http://www.adfmedia.org/News/PRDetail/10037 
[https://perma.cc/T9VE-J8HB]. 
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breakfast establishments89 and wedding venue 
providers90 are often subjected to the same fate. 
                                               
89 See, e.g., Will Brumleve, B&B Ordered to Pay Damages to 
Same-Sex Couple, Stop Discriminating, FORD CTY. REC. (Mar. 
29, 2016), http://www.paxtonrecord.net/news/courts-police-
and-fire/2016-03-29/bb-ordered-pay-damages-same-sex-
couple-stop-discriminating [https://perma.cc/T9VE-J8HB]. Jim 
and Beth Walder, who own TimberCreek Bed & Breakfast in 
Illinois, face large fines for refusing to rent their facility for a 
same-sex wedding ceremony. Id. 
In 2016, an administrative law judge ordered the Walders 
to pay a total of $80,000 in “emotional distress” damages and 
attorneys’ fees for making a same-sex couple feel “embarrassed 
and humiliated.” Id. The judge even “ordered the B&B to offer 
the Wathens access to the facility, within one year, for an event 
celebrating their civil union.” Id. The judgment is being 
appealed. See Will Brumleve, B&B Owner Taking Appeal to 
Court, Foregoing IHRC Hearing, FORD CTY. REC. (Dec. 26, 
2016), http://www.paxtonrecord.net/news/courts-police-and-
fire/2016-12-26/bb-owner-taking-appeal-court-foregoing-ihrc-
hearing [https://perma.cc/V4GL-WF6H].  
90 See, e.g., Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n Of The United 
Methodist Church v. Papaleo, No. CIV.A.07-3802 (JAP), 2007 
WL 3349787 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2007), aff’d in part and remanded 
sub nom. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of United 
Methodist Church v. Vespa-Papaleo, 339 F. App’x 232 (3d Cir. 
2009). New Jersey’s Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association 
was ordered to offer their pavilion as a wedding venue for 
same-sex couples under the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination. Id. at *2. Immediately thereafter, the 
Association shuttered its wedding venue service. See MaryAnn 
Spoto, State Sides with Lesbian Couple in Fight against Ocean 
Grove Association, NJ.COM (Dec. 30, 2008), http://www.nj.com/ 
news/index.ssf/2008/12/judge_rules_monmouth_church_gr.html 
[https://perma.cc/774T-ESGL] (noting that the parachurch 
organization no longer permits wedding ceremonies on its 
property). 
In 2011, a lesbian couple successfully sued the Catholic 
owners of the Wildflower Inn in Vermont for declining to host 
their same-sex reception. See Katie Zezima, Couple Sues a 
Vermont Inn for Rejecting Gay Wedding, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 
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Pharmacists and other health care professionals who 
decline to provide birth control they believe to be 
abortifacient can also be confronted with hefty 
penalties.91 Both for-profit and non-profit organizations 
                                               
2011), https://nyti.ms/2psU7iK. As punishment, the owners 
had to pay $10,000 in civil fines to the Vermont Human Rights 
Commission and put $20,000 in a charitable trust for the 
lesbian couple. See Katie J.M. Baker, ‘Family Friendly’ Inn 
Decides it Would Rather Stop Hosting Wedding Receptions 
Altogether Than Cater to Lesbian Couple, JEZEBEL (Aug. 24, 
2012), http://jezebel.com/5937548/family-friendly-inn-decides-
it-would-rather-stop-hosting-weddings-altogether-than-cater-
to-lesbian-couple [https://perma.cc/XS8D-RZEZ]. Jim and 
Mary O’Reilly no longer host wedding receptions on their 
property. Id. 
Robert and Cynthia Gifford, the residents of a New York 
farm that also serves as a wedding venue, were fined $13,000 
in a similar case in 2014. See Kirsten Andersen, Catholic 
Couple Fined $13,000 for Refusing to Host Same-Sex ‘Wedding’ 
at Their Farm, LIFESITENEWS (Aug. 20, 2014), 
https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/catholic-couple-fined-13000-
for-refusing-to-host-same-sex-wedding-at-their [https:// perma.cc/ 
F9SL-D89F]. The Giffords ultimately decided not to appeal the 
ruling and have stopped using the farm for wedding 
ceremonies. See Valerie Richardson, New York Farm Owners 
Give up Legal Fight after Being Fined $13,000 for Refusing to 
Host Gay Wedding, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2016), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/feb/23/robert-
cynthia-giffords-give-legal-fight-over-same/ [https://perma.cc/
F9SL-D89F].  
91 See Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1072 (9th Cir. 
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016). In 2007, the 
Washington State Pharmacy Board passed regulations 
eliminating conscience-based referrals and requiring 
pharmacies to carry “morning-after pills” Plan B and ella. Id. 
at 1072. Failure to comply with the regulations may result in 
“discipline or other enforcement actions.” WASH. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 246-869-010 (2007). The Storman family, which owns Ralph’s 
Thriftway pharmacy, and two pharmacists objected to the 
regulations because of their belief that “dispensing these drugs 
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may suffer when complicity-based religious objections 
are not respected.92 Perhaps most radically of all, 
                                               
‘constitutes direct participation in the destruction of human 
life.’” Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1073 n.3. The trial court found that 
the State’s regulations were designed to target religious health 
care providers. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 854 F. Supp. 2d 925, 
987 (W.D. Wash. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Stormans, Inc. v. 
Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015). Nevertheless, the 
Ninth Circuit denied the plaintiffs’ claims and held that the 
regulations did “not infringe a fundamental right.” Stormans, 
794 F.3d 1064. at 1088.  
Over the objection of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Alito and Thomas, the Supreme Court denied review. 
Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016). Justice 
Alito observed that Washington’s regulations “are likely to 
make a pharmacist unemployable if he or she objects on 
religious grounds to dispensing certain prescription 
medications.” Id. at 2433 (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). Anticipating the effect of the regulations, he 
suggested that Washington “would rather have no pharmacy 
than one that doesn’t toe the line on abortifacient emergency 
contraceptives.” Id. at 2440. Marveling at the policy’s “hostility 
toward religious objections” and the Court’s failure to review 
the case, Justice Alito warned, “If this is a sign of how religious 
liberty claims will be treated in the years ahead, those who 
value religious freedom have cause for great concern.” Id. at 
2433.  
92 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 
2775–76 (2014). Hobby Lobby, Conestoga Wood, and Mardel 
faced crippling fines for non-compliance with the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations about 
contraceptive provision. The Court detailed the various costs of 
non-compliance for Hobby Lobby: 
 
If the Hahns and Greens and their companies 
do not yield to this demand, the economic 
consequences will be severe. If the companies 
continue to offer group health plans that do not 
cover the contraceptives at issue, they will be 
taxed $100 per day for each affected individual. 
For Hobby Lobby, the bill could amount to $1.3 
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Professors NeJaime and Siegel suggest that religious 
leaders—including priests, pastors, imams, and rabbis—
                                               
million per day or about $475 million per year; 
for Conestoga, the assessment could be $90,000 
per day or $33 million per year; and for Mardel, 
it could be $40,000 per day or about $15 million 
per year. These sums are surely substantial. 
 
Id. at 2275–76 (citation omitted). In addition to these for-profit 
examples, consider the non-profit petitioners in Zubik v. 
Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1559 (2016) (per curiam). The Roman 
Catholic Bishop of Pittsburgh, Priests for Life, the Roman 
Catholic Archbishop of Washington, East Texas Baptist 
University, the Little Sisters of the Poor, Southern Nazarene 
University, and Geneva College were among the organizations 
that challenged the Department’s contraceptive mandate on 
RFRA grounds. Id. Organizations that fail to comply with the 
contraceptive mandate or obtain an exemption would be 
subject to a daily fine of $100 per employee. See Sarah Torre, 
Religious Liberty at the Supreme Court: Little Sisters of the 
Poor Take on Obamacare Mandate, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 
22, 2016), http://www.heritage.org/religious-liberty/report/
religious-liberty-the-supreme-court-little-sisters-the-poor-take
-obamacare [https://perma.cc/M5V7-U9ZA].  
If unable to obtain an exemption, the Little Sisters of the 
Poor could be fined “up to $70 million a year” for 
noncompliance. Id. Catholic Charities in Pittsburgh, which has 
a total operating budget of $10 million, would face between “$2 
million to $4 million a year” in federal fines. See Brian Bowling, 
Bishops Zubik, Persico Say They Can’t Cooperate with Health 
Care Mandate, TRIBLIVE (Nov. 12, 2013), http://triblive.com/ 
news/adminpage/5054656-74/mandate-catholic-coverage [https:// 
perma.cc/8ZVB-XYG4]. California’s tiny Thomas Aquinas 
College “faces fines of up to $2.8 million a year if it does not 
comply with the mandate.” Kurt Jensen, Ultimate Relief from 
Mandate May Lie Beyond the Courts, Say Plaintiffs, CATH. 
NEWS SERV. (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.catholicnews.com/ 
services/englishnews/2016/ultimate-relief-from-mandate-may-lie-
beyond-the-courts-say-plaintiffs [https://perma.cc/8ZVB-XYG4]. 
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should have no choice but to solemnize same-sex 
ceremonies.93 
Among the many penalties imposed on religious 
objectors in complicity cases, one particularly draconian 
instance stands out: In 2013, Aaron and Melissa Klein, 
the proprietors of a small Oregon bakery called Sweet 
Cakes by Melissa, declined to bake a cake for a same-sex 
wedding ceremony.94 When the same-sex couple filed a 
complaint, Oregon Labor Commissioner Brad Avakian 
ordered the Kleins to pay $135,000 in damages to 
compensate the couple for “emotional, mental and 
physical suffering” related to the refusal.95 Although the 
judgment is still being appealed, the massive penalty and 
their vulnerability to future litigation forced the Kleins 
to close their bakery in October 2016.96 “We lost our 
business,” Melissa Klein said.97 “You work so hard to 
build something up, and something you’ve poured your 
                                               
93 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2561 (“Many states 
that allow same-sex couples to marry have enacted legislation 
making clear that religious denominations and clergy have no 
obligation to solemnize a same-sex marriage.”); cf. Complaint 
at 2, Knapp v. City of Coeur d’Alene, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1118 (D. 
Idaho 2016) (No. 2:14-CV-00441-REB) (describing the plight of 
Christian ministers at a wedding chapel who faced up to 180 
days in jail and up to $1,000 in fines for each day they refused 
to perform same-sex ceremonies in violation of a local 
nondiscrimination ordinance). 
94 See In re Melissa Elaine Klein, Nos. 44-14, 45-14, 2015 WL 
4868796, at *3 (OR BOLI July 2, 2015). 
95 Id. at *23. 
96 See Casey Parks, Sweet Cakes by Melissa, Bakery that 
Turned Away Lesbians, Closes, OREGONIAN (Oct. 6, 2016), 
http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2016/10/sweet_
cakes_by_melissa_bakery.html [https://perma.cc/R7TV-543Y]. 
97 Id. 
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heart into and was your passion, to lose that has been 
devastating for me.”98 
These heavy-handed fines and penalties 
ultimately drive religious objectors out of their chosen 
service, trade, or industry. In addition to the economic 
harms imposed on the objectors themselves, the vacuum 
created imposes material harms on third parties—
particularly foster children, victims of human trafficking, 
the elderly poor, and all those who depend on religious 
hospitals and healthcare providers. The withdrawal of 
faith-based adoption services from states where “anti-
discrimination” legislation would force organizations like 
Catholic Charities to place children with adoptive same-
sex couples,99 for instance, has left a gaping vacuum that 
harms thousands of children who languish in the foster 
care system.100 A member of the U.S. Commission on 
                                               
98 Id. 
99 See Laurie Goodstein, Bishops Say Rules on Gay Parents 
Limit Freedom of Religion, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2011), 
https://nyti.ms/2n7lwCY (noting Catholic Charities’ 
withdrawal of adoption services from Massachusetts, Illinois, 
and Washington, D.C.). 
100 See Ryan Anderson & Sarah Torre, Adoption, Foster Care, 
and Conscience Protection, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 15, 2014), 
http://www.heritage.org/marriage-and-family/report/adoption-
foster-care-and-conscience-protection [https://perma.cc/R3VU-
FJTD]. 
In the two decades before Catholic Charities of Boston 
ended its adoption program, it helped place at least 720 
children in permanent adoptive homes. See Archdiocese of 
Boston, Catholic Charities of Boston To Discontinue Adoption 
Services (Mar. 10, 2006), http://www.bostoncatholic.org/
uploadedFiles/News_releases_2006_statement060310-1.pdf; 
see also U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Discrimination 
Against Catholic Adoption Services (2016), http://www.usccb
.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/upload/Adoption-
Services-Fact-Sheet-2016.pdf (“Catholic Charities of Boston, 
which had been one of the nation’s oldest adoption agencies, 
34
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 5
http://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol12/iss2/5
COMPLICITY-BASED RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS 
12 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 233 (2018) 
 
 
[267] 
Civil Rights observed with concern in 2016: “It is 
possible, perhaps even probable, that in the near future 
there will be no orthodox Christian organizations 
partnering with the government to provide adoption and 
foster care services in the United States.”101 
Forcing religious-affiliated organizations, such as 
Christian colleges, to provide health insurance plans that 
include allegedly abortifacient forms of birth control led 
some institutions to end health insurance coverage for 
their students and employees altogether.102 If forced to 
                                               
faced a very difficult choice: violate its conscience, or close its 
doors.”). 
In 2011, Illinois passed civil union legislation that, in 
conjunction with an existing “anti-discrimination” law, 
required faith-based foster care and adoption service providers 
to place children with cohabiting and same-sex couples. See 
Manya A. Brachear, 3 Dioceses Drop Foster Care Lawsuit, CHI. 
TRIB. (Nov. 15, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-
11-15/news/ct-met-catholic-charities-foster-care-20111115_1_ 
civil-unions-act-catholic-charities-religious-freedom-protection. 
As a result, Catholic Charities, the Evangelical Child and 
Family Agency, and other faith-based adoption service 
providers had to drop the adoption services of more than 2,000 
children. See Anderson & Torre, supra. Even when these 
children’s cases are transferred to other agencies, the 
ostracism of conscientious faith-based providers burdens the 
foster care system. Id. 
101 See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE: 
RECONCILING NONDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLES WITH CIVIL 
LIBERTIES 61 (2016) (statement of Comm’r Peter Kirsanow). 
102 See Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 791 F.3d 792, 793 (7th Cir. 
2015). When the Seventh Circuit refused to issue a preliminary 
injunction against the contraceptive mandate, Wheaton 
College chose to drop its health insurance plan altogether 
rather than violate its religious principles or pay substantial 
fines. See Manya Brachear Pashman, Wheaton College Ends 
Coverage amid Fight Against Birth Control Mandate, CHI. 
TRIB. (July 29, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/ 
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choose between their charitable work and their religious 
beliefs, the Little Sisters of the Poor would be compelled 
to stop serving the 13,000 elderly poor they care for on a 
regular basis.103 
Likewise, victims of human trafficking are 
harmed when religious groups’ anti-trafficking work is 
defunded simply because those groups do not provide or 
refer for abortion, contraception, or sterilization 
services.104 The failure to respect faith-based providers’ 
                                               
breaking/ct-wheaton-college-ends-student-insurance-met-
20150728-story [https://perma.cc/6ZGB-EUYQ]. 
103 See Who Are the Little Sisters of the Poor?, THE LITTLE 
SISTERS OF THE POOR, http://thelittlesistersofthepoor.com/who-
are-the-little-sisters-of-the-poor-1/#who-are-the-little-sisters-
of-the-poor [https://perma.cc/Y5L7-XLS8] (last visited Dec. 20, 
2017) (“The Little Sisters serve more than 13,000 elderly poor 
in 31 countries around the world. The first home opened in 
America in 1868 and now there are nearly 30 homes in the U.S. 
where the elderly and dying are cared for with love and dignity 
until God calls them home.”); see also Loraine Maguire, 
Obamacare Attacks Religious Liberty: Little Sisters Mother 
Provincial, USA TODAY (Mar. 22, 2016), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/03/22/little-sisters-
poor-obamacare-hhs-mandate-supreme-court-religious-liberty-
column/82076170/ [https://perma.cc/BKS3-ES3Q] (“Most of the 
people who live in my residence have nowhere else to go.”). 
104 See Chris Boyette, Federal Program Denies Grant to 
Catholic Group to Help Sex Trafficking Victims, CNN (Dec. 6, 
2011), http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2011/12/06/federal-program
-denies-grant-to-catholic-group-to-help-sex-trafficking-victims/ 
(reporting on the defunding of the United States Conference of 
Catholic Bishops’ Migrant and Refugee Service). The offending 
language in the USCCB’s contract read: 
 
As we are a Catholic organization, we need 
to ensure that our victims services funds are 
not used to refer or fund activities that would 
be contrary to our moral convictions and 
religious beliefs. . . . Specifically, 
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complicity-based objections to participating in such 
services ultimately harms “thousands of victims” of 
human trafficking.105 
Finally, if the Church Amendment and other so-
called “healthcare refusal” laws—which protect the 
conscience rights of health care providers to refuse to 
perform or assist with abortions—are withdrawn or 
diminished as Professors NeJaime and Siegel propose,106 
many faith-based hospitals and physicians would exit the 
healthcare industry rather than violate their beliefs. This 
would represent a massive disruption of American 
healthcare delivery since “one in six patients in the 
United States is treated by a Catholic hospital”107 and 
                                               
subcontractors could not provide or refer for 
abortion services or contraceptive materials for 
our clients pursuant to this contract. 
 
KEVIN BALES & RON SOODALTER, THE SLAVE NEXT DOOR 229 
(1st ed. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting the terms of the 
contract). Representative Chris Smith, the author of the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, remarked, “If you 
are a Catholic, or other faith-based [non-governmental 
organization], or a secular organization of conscience, there is 
now clear proof that your grant application will not be 
considered under a fair, impartial and totally transparent 
process . . . .” See Boyette, supra. 
105 See Boyette, supra note 104; see also Pete Winn, HHS 
Withholds Grant from U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops 
Apparently Because Church Opposes Abortion, CATH. NEWS 
SERV. (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/
article/hhs-withholds-grant-us-conference-catholic-bishops-
apparently-because-church-opposes (noting that federal grants 
to the USCCB’s Migrant and Relief Services had helped “more 
than 2,700 victims” of human trafficking). 
106 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2566. 
107 Id. at 2556–57 (citing Catholic Health Care in the United 
States, CATH. HEALTH ASS’N OF THE U.S. 1 (Jan. 2014), 
https://www.chausa.org/docs/default-source/general-files/
cha_miniprofile_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/J3WL-Z4SA]). 
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“[r]eligious hospitals represent nearly a fifth of the 
healthcare delivery system in the United States.”108 The 
extent to which Professors NeJaime and Siegel 
successfully demonstrate the United States’ dependence 
on faith-based healthcare is exactly the extent to which 
they reveal the devastation that would result if Catholic 
and other religious healthcare providers were forced to 
close their doors. Millions of Americans would experience 
reduced access and greater difficulty in obtaining life-
saving treatment and other medical services.109 
 
2. Dignitary Harms 
 
Professors NeJaime and Siegel assert that 
providing exemptions for complicity-based claims “has 
potential to harm those whom the claimants view as 
sinning.”110 But requiring religious actors to either 
violate their beliefs or close their businesses imposes 
dignitary harms on those religious objectors. Unlike the 
existing legal regime—which offers latitude for both 
individuals seeking services and religious objectors to 
live in accordance with their beliefs—weakening RFRA 
protections would marginalize religious dissenters’ views 
                                               
108 Id. at 2557 (citing Jennifer Harper, Doctors Face Religious 
Conflicts at Hospitals, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2010, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/14/doctors-
report-religious-conflicts-at-hospitals [http://perma.cc/TN3T-
UDBE]). 
109 See Catholic Health Care in the United States, CATH. 
HEALTH ASS’N OF THE U.S. (Jan. 2017), https://www. 
chausa.org/about/about/facts-statistics [https://perma.cc/GE7B-
UNQJ] (indicating that 649 Catholic hospitals annually admit 
more than five million patients, provide 105 million outpatient 
visits, and receive more than twenty million emergency room 
visits). 
110 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2516. 
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with the force of law. The “social meaning” of revoking 
RFRA protections for pharmacists who do not wish to 
dispense abortifacients or adoption agencies which do not 
wish to place children with same-sex couples is clear: 
traditional views on contested sexual norms cannot be 
acted upon in public life. It sends a message that 
individuals with religiously motivated beliefs about 
sexual morality are not welcome in certain industries. 
(“No Evangelicals need apply.”) Indeed, if an individual 
does act upon her religious convictions and integrates her 
faith and work, the law will not shield her and may 
actually impose penalties for her divergence from the 
new political orthodoxy on sexual morality.  
Such a legal regime imposes a far greater stigma 
on religious believers than does the status quo on third 
parties seeking services. This is for two reasons. First, 
because the force of law would be used to actively 
penalize complicity-based refusals, this legal regime 
would be more coercive. Without robust RFRA 
protections, the law would directly disfavor religious 
individuals who hold traditional views by making their 
refusals illegal. The status quo minimizes coercion by 
permitting the religious actor to refuse or not, and by 
allowing the third party seeking services to select any 
other willing provider. Second, weakening or eliminating 
accommodations for complicity-based refusals has a 
pedagogical effect that stigmatizes religious actors who 
hold traditional views on sexual morality. Rather than 
remain neutral as between the religious objector and the 
third party and allowing both sides to retain maximal 
freedom to organize their affairs, such a rule would 
explicitly disfavor the religious objector.111 It would treat 
the dignitary interests of the third party as more worthy 
                                               
111 See supra note 65. 
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of legal solicitude. The “social meaning” of this favoritism 
would communicate that the religious objector has sinned 
by acting on her archaic moral beliefs. It would convey, 
in short, that she is a bigot.112 
Thus, using Professors NeJaime and Siegel’s 
reasoning and definition of dignitary harm, the religious 
objector is harmed at least as much (if not more) when 
accommodations are denied than the third party seeking 
services when accommodations are permitted. 
 
III. Accommodations Promote Social Peace 
 
Professors NeJaime and Siegel argue that 
accommodations for complicity-based religious objections 
will only prolong and intensify conflict over culture war 
issues.113 They argue that the “social logic” of “cross-
denominational mobilization”114 means politically active 
religious traditionalists will try “to enforce traditional 
morality in the law of abortion and marriage and to seek 
conscience-based exemptions from laws that depart from 
traditional morality.”115 Having lost the primary battle, 
traditionalists now use complicity-based claims as “a way 
                                               
112 It is commonly asserted that protections for religious 
freedom shelter bigotry. See, e.g., Valerie Tarico, Right-Wing 
Christianity Teaches Bigotry: The Ugly Roots of Indiana’s New 
Anti-Gay Law, SALON (Apr. 4, 2015), http://www. 
salon.com/2015/04/04/right_wing_christianity_teaches_bigotry
_the_ugly_roots_of_indianas_new_anti_gay_law_partner/ 
[https://perma.cc/BU6R-H5QZ] (describing a state RFRA law 
as motivated by “bigotry and homophobia”). Curtailing RFRA 
protections because of the “dignitary harms” imposed on third 
parties grants these accusations legal imprimatur. 
113 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2553–63 
(“[A]ccommodating religious exemption claims may not settle 
conflict, as many contend.”). 
114 Id. at 2544. 
115 Id. at 2548. 
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to continue conflict over community-wide norms in a new 
form.”116 Widespread healthcare refusal laws, for 
example, can be used to impede access to abortion117—
especially in areas dominated by religiously affiliated 
healthcare providers.118 Conscience protections for 
wedding vendors could be used “to forestall or restrict an 
antidiscrimination regime that includes sexual 
orientation.”119 Thus, religious accommodations 
perpetuate culture war rivalries that Professors NeJaime 
and Siegel would rather put an end to. 
Even if Professors NeJaime and Siegel are right 
that religious exemptions perpetuate culture war 
conflicts, there is no reasonable or equitable alternative. 
There is reason for hope, however, that accommodations 
can promote social peace rather than intensify conflict. 
 
A. No Reasonable Alternatives to 
Accommodation Exist 
 
No matter how much Professors NeJaime and 
Siegel wish that the culture wars would disappear if 
religious accommodations were curtailed, the reality is 
that crushing the “other side” will not work.120 This is 
                                               
116 Id. at 2553. 
117 Id. at 2555. 
118 Id. at 2557. 
119 Id. at 2564. 
120 See generally Girgis, supra note 65, at 413. Although 
NeJaime and Siegel may not be motivated by political 
vindictiveness, there is an undercurrent of victor’s justice 
present among opponents of religious accommodations. This 
attitude is best reflected by Professor Mark Tushnet, who 
wrote in a revealing and now infamous blog post: 
 
The culture wars are over; they lost, we won. . 
. . For liberals, the question now is how to deal 
with the losers in the culture wars. That’s 
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mostly a question of tactics. My own judgment 
is that taking a hard line (“You lost, live with 
it”) is better than trying to accommodate the 
losers . . . . Trying to be nice to the losers didn’t 
work well after the Civil War, nor after Brown. 
(And taking a hard line seemed to work 
reasonably well in Germany and Japan after 
1945.) I should note that LGBT activists in 
particular seem to have settled on the hard-line 
approach, while some liberal academics defend 
more accommodating approaches. . . . Of course 
all bets are off if Donald Trump becomes 
President. 
 
Mark Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive Crouch Liberal 
Constitutionalism, BALKINIZATION (May 6, 2016, 1:15 PM), 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/05/abandoning-defensive-
crouch-liberal.html [https://perma.cc/DCW5-BZKU].  
 In a later clarification blog post, Tushnet noted that 
reactions to his post claimed that he believed religious 
objectors, especially in complicity cases, should be treated like 
defeated Confederates and Nazis: 
 
In the context I was writing about, for example, 
“taking a hard line” means opposing on both 
policy and constitutional grounds free-standing 
so-called “religious liberty” laws. . . . [T]he 
exemptions that might satisfy “our side” would 
have to be pretty narrow [including] . . . some 
sort of constraint on the exemptions’ 
availability in cases of claimed “complicity.” (I 
don’t know whether even these would be 
acceptable to activists on “our side.”) . . . [L]ike 
the Japanese soldiers who were stranded on 
islands in the Pacific and didn't know the war 
was over, so too many people on their side 
haven't yet come to terms with the fact that 
they lost the culture wars. 
 
Mark Tushnet, What Does “Taking a Hard Line” Mean?, 
BALKINIZATION (May 9, 2016, 8:28 PM), https://balkin. 
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because the clash runs deeper than the surface legal 
conflict between free exercise and nondiscrimination: it 
is a “conflict between two worldviews, both held with the 
intensity generally associated with religious belief.”121 
The most fundamental convictions about the nature of 
God, man, and morality are at stake. A take-no-prisoners 
legal approach is unlikely to change the deeply held 
beliefs of religious traditionalists who, as of yet, still 
constitute a sizable nationwide minority. This is 
especially true while conscience protections in complicity 
cases still enjoy substantial support.122 Subjecting 
sympathetic religious objectors to severe penalties and 
                                               
blogspot.com/2016/05/what-does-taking-hard-line-mean.html 
[https://perma.cc/G84Q-F77S]. 
121 See Statement of Comm’r Peter Kirsanow, supra note 101, 
at 43. 
122 See PEW RES. CTR., WHERE THE PUBLIC STANDS ON 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY VS. NONDISCRIMINATION 3 (2016) (finding 
that 30% of U.S. adults believe “[e]mployers who have a 
religious objection to the use of birth control should be . . . able 
to refuse to provide it in health insurance plans for their 
employees,” and that 48% believe “[b]usinesses that provide 
wedding services should be . . . able to refuse to provide those 
services to same-sex couples if the business owner has religious 
objections to homosexuality”); National Poll Shows Majority 
Support Healthcare Conscience Rights, Conscience Law, 
CHRISTIAN MED. ASS’N (May 2011), http://www. 
freedom2care.org/docLib/200905011_Pollingsummaryhandout
.pdf [https://perma.cc/6D3Z-FS3T] (finding that 77% of U.S. 
adults believe healthcare professionals should not be “forced to 
participate in procedures or practices to which they have moral 
objections,” and that 50% support “a law under which federal 
agencies and other government bodies that receive federal 
funds could not discriminate against hospitals and health care 
professionals who decline to participate in abortions.”). 
43
et al.: Complicity-Based Religious Accommodations
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2018
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
VOLUME 12 | WINTER 2018 | ISSUE 2 
 
 
[276] 
jail time may alienate those who would otherwise support 
socially liberal policies on abortion and LGBT issues.123  
Court rulings which are perceived to crush 
religious dissenters may unintentionally revive the 
specter of persecution (perhaps plausibly), leading 
disfavored religious objectors to cling more intensely to 
their beliefs.124 A hard line approach would socially 
exclude and marginalize religious objectors, driving 
many people of faith out of entire industries and 
segments of society.125 Indeed, activists demanding the 
                                               
123  PEW RES. CTR, supra note 122, at 5. (finding that 22% of 
U.S. adults sympathized with both sides of the contraceptive 
coverage issue, and that 18% of U.S. adults sympathized with 
both sides of the wedding vendor issue). 
124 See Bradford Richardson, Persecution of Christians is on the 
Rise, Americans Say, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2016, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/apr/5/christians-
facing-increased-persecution-america-po/ [https://perma.cc/
FKA3-CGX8] (reporting that 63% of LifeWay survey 
respondents believe Christians face growing levels of 
persecution); see also Right Wing Watch Staff, The Persecution 
Complex: The Religious Right’s Deceptive Rallying Cry, RIGHT 
WING WATCH 2 (2014), http://files.rightwingwatch.org/uploads/ 
persecution_report_V2.pdf (“The religious persecution 
narrative is nothing new . . . but it has taken off in recent years 
in reaction to advances in gay rights and reproductive 
freedom.”); cf. Matthew 5:11 (New King James) (“Blessed are 
you when they . . . persecute you . . . for My sake.”). 
125 See Statement of Comm’r Peter Kirsanow, supra note 101, 
at 111 (“People who live in accordance with their unfashionable 
religious beliefs will be unable to work in many professions. 
When a baker or a photographer or a CEO is forced to 
participate in activities that offend their religious beliefs, what 
hope is there for a doctor, a counselor, a lawyer? Traditional 
believers will have very few careers where they can both make 
a living and live according to their faith. It is an unofficial form 
of the legal disabilities imposed on English Catholics following 
the Glorious Revolution.”); cf. Sohrab Ahmari, Sweden 
Blacklists an Antiabortion Midwife, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 10, 2017, 
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withdrawal of religious liberty protections may 
themselves be engaged in a form of social hostility toward 
religious groups that adhere to traditional moral 
beliefs.126 If “pluralist democracy is dynamic and 
fragile,”127 then maintaining it “depends on the 
commitment of all politically relevant groups to its 
processes. Political losers may exit the system unless 
they think their interests will be accommodated or their 
losses from exiting will exceed their gains.”128 This is a 
distinct danger because pluralistic democracy “needs 
emerging groups to commit to its processes just as much 
as it needs established groups to stick to those 
processes.”129 
Removing accommodations and imposing stiff 
penalties on religious objectors may also entrench 
resistance to ascendant sexual mores and foment social 
backlash. When courts aggressively implement a social 
agenda, it can be interpreted that the courts engage 
opponents more intensely than supporters, which could 
lead to political exploitation and widespread resistance to 
                                               
2:33 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sweden-blacklists-an-
antiabortion-midwife-1491768904 [https://perma.cc/HF7Q-
AGDQ] (describing the legal and professional ostracism of a 
Swedish midwife who refuses to perform abortions). 
126 See, e.g., Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive Crouch, supra note 
120. 
127 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How 
Courts Can Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of 
Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1294 (2005). 
128 Id. Eskridge adds, “Groups will disengage when they believe 
that participation in the system is pointless due to their 
permanent defeat on issues important to them . . . or when the 
political process imposes fundamental burdens on them or 
threatens their group identity or cohesion.” Id. at 1293. 
129 Id. at 1294. 
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that agenda.130 Widespread support for conscience 
exceptions in complicity cases, the deeply held nature of 
religious belief, and the backing of a major political party 
increases the likelihood of political backlash. The 
elimination of accommodations in complicity cases is 
unlikely to dampen the flame of cultural contests. Not 
only are these conflicts inevitable, they may even be 
desirable when properly channeled.131 
Since “total war” tactics are deleterious to social 
cohesion, living in a sharply divided pluralistic society 
requires both accommodation of religious believers and 
respect for those who do not share their moralistic views. 
Professors NeJaime and Siegel’s explanation that 
complicity claims are unique in their “social logic” is 
inadequate. Even if religious accommodations are 
sometimes used “to enforce traditional norms against 
those who do not share their beliefs”132 rather than to 
“preserv[e] space for distinctive religious beliefs and 
                                               
130 See Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage 
Equality and Racial Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 148–51 
(2013); see also Neal Devins, I Love You, Big Brother, 87 CAL. 
L. REV. 1283, 1297 (1999) (remarking on “the disastrous 
backlash that occurred in the wake of Roe v. Wade”); Michael 
J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The 
Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81 (1994). Professor Siegel, 
while acknowledging destructive aspects of backlash, believes 
that it nonetheless has redeeming and socially beneficial 
qualities. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic 
Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
373, 388–91 (2007). 
131 See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 101, at 214 
(testimony of Marc O. DeGirolami) (“Conflict is an essential 
and deep feature of our society—both unavoidable and actually 
desirable, since its source is our different backgrounds, 
different outlooks, and different memories.”). 
132 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2591. 
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practices,”133 this use is no more injurious to pluralism 
than the proposal for which Professors NeJaime and 
Siegel advocate. On balance, offering robust protections 
for religious objectors is more likely to contribute to a 
diverse public square.134 
Rather than viewing social conflict as “a barely 
contained threat to individual rights and peaceful 
coexistence”135 and “evincing skepticism that shared life 
is at all possible between groups locked in intractable 
conflict,”136 skeptics of religious accommodations should 
embrace what Professor John Inazu calls, confident 
pluralism.137 This approach calls both religious believers 
and skeptics alike to acknowledge that “shared existence 
is not only possible, but also necessary.”138 According to 
Inazu, both sides should accept a constitutional 
commitment to both inclusion (that we are continually 
reshaping the boundaries of our political community)139 
and dissent (that even as we work to extend and 
                                               
133 Id. at 2590. 
134 See Ryan T. Anderson, The Defense of Marriage Isn’t Over, 
PUB. DISCOURSE (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www. 
thepublicdiscourse.com/2014/10/13889 [http://perma.cc/UA54-
7EH5] (“Protecting religious liberty and the rights of 
conscience is the embodiment of a principled pluralism that 
fosters a more diverse civil sphere. Indeed, tolerance is 
essential to promoting peaceful coexistence even amid 
disagreement.”). 
135 Girgis, supra note 65, at 413. 
136 See id. (suggesting that the “honest Rousseauian fear that 
“[i]t is impossible to live at peace with those whom we regard 
as damned” motivates the quest to retract religious 
accommodations (quoting JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE 
SOCIAL CONTRACT 122 (Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin ed., 
1968) (1762)). 
137 JOHN D. INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM (2016). 
138 Id. at 6. Professor Inazu adds that confident pluralism “does 
not suppress or ignore conflict—it invites it.” Id. at 7. 
139 Id. at 15–16. 
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renegotiate these boundaries, we recognize the freedom 
of citizens in the voluntary groups of civil society to differ 
from established norms).140 Although neither of these 
principles are absolute, they can help foster a modest 
agreement on the individual rights of both parties. 
Rather than seeking to impose their own orthodoxy, both 
sides must allow room for mutual toleration.141  
Confident pluralism also proposes a civic 
aspiration of “living speech,” which prioritizes dialogue 
and persuasion over combativeness and coercion. 142 Both 
traditionalists and advocates clamoring for the 
withdrawal of conscience protections would do well to 
recall the Court’s advice to the Texans who proscribed 
flag desecration: “The way to preserve the flag’s special 
role is not to punish those who feel differently about these 
matters. It is to persuade them that they are wrong.”143 
 
B. Private Ordering and Markets Mitigate 
Social Conflict 
 
Rather than using the coercive force of law to 
impose a new orthodoxy on matters of sexual politics, 
private ordering—guided by principles of confident 
pluralism144—should be allowed to flourish. Market-
                                               
140 Id. at 16. 
141 Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 735 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Tolerance 
is a two-way street. Otherwise, the rule mandates orthodoxy, 
not anti-discrimination.”). 
142 INAZU, supra note 137, at 101. 
143 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419 (1989). 
144 Professor Inazu affirms that “[b]oycotts, strikes, and 
protests against private actors are in most cases compatible 
with confident pluralism,” but warns that “[w]hen we engage 
in these forms of collective action, we should bear in mind the 
civic aspirations of tolerance, humility, and patience.” See 
supra note 137, at 115. 
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based systems, which permit businesses and civil society 
groups to shape social norms, are preferable to a 
compulsory legal approach that eliminates 
accommodations for religious objectors.145 Rather than 
impose a uniform orthodoxy on society about contested 
moral issues, “subsidiary institutions [should] hav[e] 
spheres of private ordering that allow them to organically 
. . . come to their own conclusions about those contested 
matters.”146 
Civic organizations—whether motivated by profit 
or conviction—have already begun to develop their own 
approaches to navigating conflicts between religious 
liberty and issues of gender, sexuality, and reproduction. 
For example, the popular room-rental service Airbnb 
recently adopted a policy prohibiting all of its users from 
discriminating on the basis of “sexual orientation, gender 
identity, or marital status.”147 Airbnb’s policy shapes 
social norms by excluding many religious traditionalists 
                                               
145 See Adam J. MacLeod, Tempering Civil Rights Conflicts: 
Common Law for the Moral Marketplace, 2016 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 643, 672 (2016) (arguing that laws impinging on religious 
liberty “do not leave space for mediating conflicts between 
actors within the domains of private ordering. Instead, they 
turn all important questions into zero-sum contests and raise 
the stakes even higher”); id. at 679–80 (observing that when 
civic goods “require cooperation for their realization, legal 
coercion destroys both the economic and the moral value of 
those plural practices and institutions of private ordering.”). 
146 Michael P. Moreland, Religious Freedom and 
Discrimination, 4 J. CHRISTIAN LEGAL THOUGHT 10 (2014). 
147 See Airbnb’s Nondiscrimination Policy: Our Commitment to 
Inclusion and Respect, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/ 
help/article/1405/airbnb-s-nondiscrimination-policy--our-
commitment-to-inclusion-and-respect [https://perma.cc/495K-
2DZ2] (last visited Dec. 20, 2017). 
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from using its service.148 But religious traditionalists 
remain at liberty to use other online room-rental services, 
or to set up their own service that complies with the 
dictates of conscience. Ride-hailing services such as Uber 
and Lyft prohibit both drivers and passengers from 
discriminating on the basis of “sexual orientation or 
gender identity.”149 If for some reason a religious objector 
refused to use Uber on that basis, they would remain free 
to hail a taxi or launch their own ride-hailing service. 
Boycotts can serve a similar purpose, so long as 
they are used to “represent[] minority viewpoints against 
majoritarian norms” rather than “harness[] majoritarian 
power to squelch dissenting viewpoints.”150 Most 
                                               
148 Users who decline “won’t be able to host or book using 
Airbnb” and are invited to close their accounts. General 
questions about the Airbnb Community Commitment, AIRBNB, 
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/1523/general-questions-
about-the-airbnb-community-commitment [https://perma.cc/
8AJN-JWF5] (last visited Dec. 20, 2017). 
149 Ben Wear, Uber, Lyft Say Policies Ban Discrimination 
Based on Sexual Orientation, AUSTIN AM-STATESMAN (Apr. 24, 
2017), http://www.statesman.com/news/transportation/uber-
lyft-say-policies-ban-discrimination-based-sexual-
orientation/eWDh5e48iN3OXCBP1rmDEM/ [https://perma.cc/
PJK3-VFNM]; Uber Non-Discrimination Policy, UBER, 
https://www.uber.com/legal/policies/non-discrimination-policy/
en/ [https://perma.cc/8JKY-X6LT] (last visited Dec. 20, 2017) 
(prohibiting “discrimination on the basis of discrimination 
against riders or drivers based on . . . sexual orientation, . . . 
marital status, [or] gender identity”). Violators “lose access to 
the Uber platform.” Id. 
150 See INAZU, supra note 137, at 107; see also Ross Douthat, 
The Case of Brendan Eich, N.Y. TIMES: EVALUATIONS (Apr. 8, 
2014), https://nyti.ms/2mpxYAr (“[Although] a healthy 
pluralism inevitably involves community norms and 
community policing in some form, I suspect that an elite 
culture that enforces the new norms on marriage this strictly, 
and polices its own ranks this rigorously, is likely to find 
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consumer boycotts—such as those against Target, Chick-
fil-A, and Hobby Lobby151—“occur in reasonably 
pluralistic settings.”152 Others forms of collective action, 
which resemble witch-hunting more than constructive 
norm-shaping, might violate the principles of 
pluralism.153 
Instances of market-driven norm-shaping are 
healthy insofar as they seek to nudge attitudes and 
behaviors rather than coerce them. If businesses such as 
Airbnb and Uber can use market power to express their 
views and influence public opinion (even when doing so 
imposes material or “dignitary harms” on third parties), 
why not ChristianMingle when its core religious beliefs 
                                               
reasons (and, indeed, is already adept at finding them) to 
become increasingly anti-pluralist whenever it has the chance 
to enforce those same norms on society as a whole.”). 
151 See, e.g., Hayley Peterson, The Target Boycott Cost More 
than Anyone Expected — and the CEO was Blindsided, BUS. 
INSIDER (Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/target-
ceo-blindsided-by-boycott-2017-4 [https://perma.cc/T32U-XRSJ] 
(describing the effects of a boycott related to Target’s 
transgender restroom policy); Editorial, Progressives Against 
Lunch, WALL ST. J. (May 8, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/progressives-against-lunch-1462744747 [https:// 
perma.cc/LCC9-K52H] (describing both boycotts and counter-
boycotts of Chick-Fil-A); Trudy Ring, Here’s Why George Takei 
Wants You to Boycott Hobby Lobby, ADVOCATE (July 2, 2014), 
http://www.advocate.com/politics/2014/07/02/heres-why-
george-takei-wants-you-boycott-hobby-lobby [https://perma.cc/
E6YG-C4M3]. 
152 INAZU, supra note 137, at 113. 
153 See, e.g., Mary Bowerman, Indiana Pizza Shop that Won’t 
Cater Gay Weddings to Close, USA TODAY (Apr. 1, 2015), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2015/04/01/
indiana-family-pizzeria-wont-cater-gay-weddings/70813430/ 
[https://perma.cc/VA7N-3KVS] (describing how journalists 
baited a small, rural pizza parlor into saying that it would not 
serve same-sex weddings and how, as a result, the parlor was 
overwhelmed by threatening messages and forced to close). 
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are implicated?154 Why not religious business owners—
such as florists, bakers, and pharmacists? By the same 
principle, civic institutions with religious commitments 
should be accommodated so that they may set their own 
codes of conduct when possible. Private ordering can 
alleviate social tensions when its structures embody 
“tolerance, humility, and patience”155 rather than 
exacerbate division. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Complicity is a long-established concept in our 
legal tradition. It neither operates differently in the 
context of religious liberty claims, nor does it deserve the 
law’s special disfavor. The third-party harm theory 
exaggerates complicity’s perceived differences from other 
religious liberty claims and invents its own novel concept 
of “dignitary harms,” which has never before been 
countenanced in First Amendment jurisprudence. Even 
if the third-party harm theory were coherent and 
cognizable, its current formulation regrettably excludes 
the material and dignitary harms that would be imposed 
on religious objectors should accommodations be 
narrowed or revoked. In other words, “dignitary harm” is 
a two-edged sword. Eliminating religious 
accommodations in these situations is unlikely to foster 
social peace.  
                                               
154 See Jacob Gershman & Sara Randazzo, ChristianMingle 
Opens Doors to Gay Singles Under Settlement, WALL ST. J.: L. 
BLOG (June 30, 2016), https://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/06/30/ 
christianmingle-com-opens-doors-to-gay-singles-under-
settlement/ (reporting that ChristianMingle has agreed to 
permit same-sex matches after settling a discrimination 
lawsuit). 
155 INAZU, supra note 137, at 83. 
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Thus, instead of using the coercive force of law to 
censor expressive conduct and to lock-in the gains of the 
sexual revolution, market-based systems and private 
ordering should be allowed to take their course. If we are 
to have a truly diverse and pluralistic public square, 
there must be consideration for both religious actors and 
third parties. That includes robust accommodations for 
religious objectors in complicity cases. Perhaps most 
importantly, it includes a posture of humility and mutual 
respect. 
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